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Abstract A considerable amount of the required information in risk and emergency
management is geographical, but this information does not always reach the right
actors at the right time, so how can geographical information be organised in such a
way that it supports risk and emergency management more effectively? The answer
requires a conceptualisation of risk and emergency management practices resulting
in the network-centric concept, which implies that those involved in risk and
emergency management are connected and that they have the capability to share and
access information. The concept was made operational through the development of
an information system and the exchange of geographical information within the
system was facilitated by the use of peer-to-peer networking in combination with a
client server network. On the application level, the information was presented in
both map and text forms to support the exchange of information between actors.
This way of organising geographical information and technology leads to improved
information and communication, better situational awareness and faster decision
making.
Keywords Network-centric . Spatial information infrastructures . Emergency
management . Risk management
Appl. Spatial Analysis (2012) 5:51–72
DOI 10.1007/s12061-010-9059-z
J. M. M. Neuvel (*)
Centre for Urban and Environmental Development, Saxion University of Applied Sciences,
P.O. Box 70.000, 7500 KB Enschede, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.m.m.neuvel@saxion.nl
H. J. Scholten
SPINlab / Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1087,
1081 HVAmsterdam, The Netherlands
A. van den Brink
Landscape Architecture Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen,
The Netherlands
Introduction
Recent emergencies and emergency response exercises have highlighted major
information deficiencies in risk management (activities related to the prevention and
mitigation of risks) and emergency management (including activities related to
emergency training, response and short-term recovery). Important information did
not reach the right organisations and people at the right time, resulting in
unnecessary loss of life and property (Kevany 2003; National Research Council
2007; Van de Ven and Van den Berg 2007).
The Dutch Bonfire exercise in 2004 illustrated the type of information
deficiencies that can appear (COT et al. 2005). This particular exercise dealt with
the potential threat of a terrorist attack in the Rotterdam harbour and an attack on the
Amsterdam Arena stadium. During the exercises, important individuals such as the
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Director-General for Public
Safety and Security as well as the ministerial and inter-ministerial policy teams, were
not provided with integrated information on time and in a consistent way. Some
information was available to other organisations but was not actively requested by
organisations in need of this information. The national coordination centre was
unable to integrate information from different sources, and thereby unable to get a
more complete overview of the current situation. Moreover, the emergency rooms of
the police department, fire department and the medical services had only a limited
overview of the situation at the scene of the attacks, which also hampered effective
decision making. Clearly then, information management is crucial in risk and
emergency management, but important information does not always reach the right
services and individuals at the right time, thus constraining effective mitigation,
preparation, response and recovery.
In addition to the recognition of information in general as crucial element,
geospatial information in particular is regarded as indispensable. A considerable part
of the information required before and during emergencies contains a specific spatial
reference, such as the location of toxic clouds or flooded areas or the location of
emergency services. For this reason, much effort is put into the development of geo-
information and communications technology (Geo-ICT) or geotechnology for risk
and emergency management (Cova 2005; Greene 2002; Kevany 2003; Köhler and
Wächter 2006; MacFarlane 2005; National Research Council 2007; Parker et al.
2007). Consequently, the organisation of geographical information and consequently
geotechnology requires special attention in addition to the organisation of
information in general. This paper focuses on the question of whether geo-
information and geotechnology can be organised in such a way that it supports
decision-making processes within risk and emergency management more effectively.
The research is based on the idea that the search for an appropriate role for
geoinformation and geotechnology in risk and emergency management should not
start with a particular technology, but with a conception of risk and emergency
management activities. This statement follows Klosterman (2001) who argued that
the search for an appropriate role for computer-based information and methods must
begin with the conception of the activity that should be supported. A technology
driven approach can limit our view resulting in a focus on those aspects of risk
management and emergency management for which a particular technology or tool
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is appropriate, but neglecting other vital elements of risk and emergency
management activities. As a result, the technologies may not meet the particular
needs of the risk and emergency managers. For this reason, the central research
objective is to develop a conception of risk and emergency management which can
be used as a basis for the organisation of geographical information for decision
support in general.
Research Strategy and Method
A conception of risk and emergency management can be developed in different
ways. On the one hand, this conception can be obtained deductively, implying that
knowledge of individual phenomena is derived from universal laws. Consequently,
general ideas about emergency response can be applied to individual practices and
these general ideas can be used as starting point for the organisation of
geoinformation and geotechnology in these practices. On the other hand, the
conception can be obtained inductively. A conception of risk management can be
based on studying particular risk management practices through which more general
concepts and mechanisms are highlighted. Abduction can be regarded as a way to
mediate between inductive and deductive reasoning. Similar to induction, the
starting point of abduction is in the specific rather than the general. The researcher
looks at particular situation-specific phenomena; he/she does not only describe these
phenomena, but also makes new interpreting links (Danermark et al. 2002). The
examined risk and emergency management practices can be interpreted through
existing ideas e.g. from the literature or other examined practices. Through this
interaction between the individual observations with more general ideas derived
from the literature or experiences with previous practices, a specific conceptualisa-
tion of the risk and emergency management practices at hand is developed. This
strategy reflects the strategy of our conceptualisation of risk and emergency
management.
Our conceptualisation of risk and emergency management is based on two
different projects: the GeoRisk project (www.georisk.nl) and the Geo-Data
Infrastructure for Disaster Management (GDI4DM) project (www.gdi4dm.nl) in
the Netherlands in which the authors participated. The GeoRisk project focussed on
activities related to risk management in spatial planning. These activities were studied
through examining planning practices with respect to the consideration of flood risks
and industrial risks in spatial planning. Moreover, information requirements for dealing
with risks in planning were considered (Projectconsortium Georisk 2008). The project
consortium included three universities, three research institutes, two consultancy
companies, one municipality, one province, the directorate-general for Public Works
and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat—DWW) and one safety region. Safety
regions are responsible for emergency response. In the Netherlands, emergency
management services are organised regionally. The country is divided into 25 safety
regions and each safety region, which includes several municipalities, consists of a
police department, fire department, and medical and paramedical services.
Within the GDI4DM project, emergency response processes were studied through
examining information and system requirements of the actors involved in emergency
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response (Neuvel and Zlatanova 2006; Snoeren 2006). Ideas on risk and emergency
management found in external literature were used as an interpreting framework to
make links between the different initial conceptualisations of risk and emergency
management resulting from the examination of risk and emergency management
practices.
Whereas the GeoRisk project mainly focussed on the way spatial planners deal
with safety risks and on the requirements for geotechnology in spatial planning, the
GDI4DM project also aimed at developing Geo-ICT. Within this project, the
conception of emergency management was made operational in principles for spatial
information infrastructures (SIIs) for emergency management at the regional level.
Based on these principles, an information system was developed to support
command and control, referred to as Eagle, The safety region Gelderland Midden,
located in the east of the Netherlands (see also Fig. 6), asked Geodan to modernise
its existing Command & Control System, adjusting it to the network-centric work
approach. In close cooperation with the Gelderland Midden region, ESRI, Microsoft
and the Ministry of Defense and Homeland Security, Geodan developed the Eagle
system. This system was tested and evaluated in the GDI4DM project during a
regional emergency exercise known as Eagle One (Brooijmans 2008; Geodan 2008;
Riedijk et al. 2008; Van Capelleveen 2008; Van de Ven 2008). The Gelderland
Midden safety region is using Eagle in emergency trainings and regional crisis
situations.
The GDI4DM project consortium also included three universities, one ‘safety
region’, one municipality, one province, the cadastre and the directorate-general for
Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat—RWS). The GDI4DM
project can be regarded as one of the leading projects on this topic in the
Netherlands, since the Eagle One exercise was awarded the Public Safety Award in
2008. The jury of this award consisted of 11 key figures on public safety from the
Government and knowledge institutes including professors, mayors and directors of
emergency services and research institutes. The Eagle application, which uses
Microsoft technology, was also highlighted by networkworld as an innovative
Microsoft research project (www.networkworld.com).
This paper describes and reflects on the findings of these two projects. In the
following section, a conception of risk and emergency management is discussed,
resulting in the concept of network-centric risk and emergency management which
was used as point of departure for the development of Eagle to support emergency
management. Subsequently, the added value of geoinformation and geotechnology
for network-centric risk and emergency management is described. We then discuss
the architecture and applications of Eagle and the experiences with Eagle in the
Eagle One emergency management exercise. In the concluding section, we reflect on
the use of the network-centric approach as concept for the organisation of
geoinformation and geotechnology in risk and emergency management.
The Conceptualisation of Risk and Emergency Management
The conceptualisation of risk and emergency management was a process that took
place from the writing of the project proposal at the beginning, until the evaluation
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of the use of geoinformation in the emergency training at the end. The resulting
conception of risk and emergency management can be summarised in three key
principles, which in the end resulted into the conceptualisation of risk and
emergency management as network-centric operations:
& risk management and emergency response is a collaborative process, which
implies the connection of all the actors involved;
& collaboration requires a shared situational awareness; and
& collaboration and a shared situation awareness require the sharing of information.
First of all, risk and emergency management was recognised as a collaborative
process. Collaboration between safety experts and spatial planners was regarded as
crucial for the consideration of safety risks in spatial planning (Projectconsortium
Georisk 2008). Through this collaboration, both safety issues and potential ways to
deal with the safety issues could be addressed in the planning process and a
commitment for the consideration of safety risks could be created. Moreover, during
an emergency response, cooperation between actors is required for effective action.
During an evacuation, for example, the police department will be responsible for
traffic management but the municipalities are responsible for communication with
citizens (Diehl and Van der Heide 2005). Consequently, emergency response has to
be carried out by multiple agencies in which both vertical and horizontal
coordination is required, requiring the collaboration of all the actors involved.
Establishing connections can be regarded as an important challenge, since actors
involved in emergency response are often spread out between different organisations
which may have different physical locations. Moreover, actors within one
organisation may also be spread out in the field or between offices.
In addition, collaboration requires a shared situational awareness. When there is
a weak section of dike but actor A assumes that it is on the left side of the river bank
and actor B believes that it is on the right side, collaboration to deal with the specific
weak spot will be confused. Collaboration in spatial planning also requires shared
situational awareness. For example, when spatial planners and safety experts have
different knowledge about the nature and amount of hazardous materials in a
particular installation, they will apply different safety distances for urban develop-
ments in the vicinity of the site. Shared situational awareness is located in the mind,
rather than being available in an information system or in other media such as a
handbook. Shared situational awareness therefore differs from the term common
operational picture; for example, when the information system shows that the weak
dike section is on the left side, but actor B interprets it as the right side, there is a
common operational picture of the situation, but not a shared situational awareness.
Collaboration and shared situation awareness, however, require the sharing of
information. Information and communication are recognised as central elements in
both risk and emergency management. Information is a prerequisite for situational
awareness, which allows collaboration and coordination of these actions. The
exchange of information is regarded as time critical, especially in emergency
response. A common operational picture, as well as a shared situational awareness,
requires the exchange of valid and up-to-date information between all the involved
actors at the same time. The information that has to be distributed can consist of
information that already exists prior to an event such as information about
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topography or contingency plans but also of information that becomes available
during an event, referred to as in situ information, such as intelligence about a
collapsed dike or on the geographical position of the emergency services.
Ideas about network-centric operations were useful for structuring the principles
of risk and emergency management because similar to the presented ideas on risk
and emergency management, the concept of network-centric operations has
collaboration as point of departure. Moreover, the concept explicitly specifies the
role of information in these collaborative process from which informational and
system requirements can be derived, which also fitted in the principles of risk and
emergency management that were developed already within the project. For these
reasons, ‘network-centric risk and emergency management’ was used as the
interpreting framework through which the different conceptualisations of risk and
emergency management can be structured and integrated. The term network-centric
is derived from a military context where ‘network-centric warfare’ is the term used
for the US military response to the information age. It implies that military
operations are enabled by the networking of the armed forces and this networking
takes place in the physical, information and cognitive domains (Alberts et al. 2001).
The physical domain is the domain that the military seeks to influence, and includes
the activities or events in a particular area that need to be controlled. The information
domain is the domain where information is created, manipulated and shared. The
cognitive domain is regarded as the domain of the mind of the actors involved in
warfare which includes tactics, strategies and techniques. Principles of network-
centric warfare can also be applied to other fields so we can speak of network-centric
operations that have been applied to emergency management as well (Von Lubitz
et al. 2008a, b). If applied to risk and emergency management activities, we can
speak of ‘network-centric risk and emergency management’ (NCREM) (Table 1).
The physical domain then involves the area that the risk and emergency managers
seek to influence. The information domain includes the information created and
needed for effective risk management and response and here a distinction can be
made between data and information. Data can be regarded as the basic descriptive
characteristics of things and placed in a comparatively raw format such as
observations, counts, measurements, locations or attributes, whereas information is
regarded as more processed, organised, summarised, selective and user friendly, with
the intention of assisting correct interpretation (Parker et al. 2007). The common
Table 1 Characteristics of network-centric risk and emergency response
Domain Characteristics
Information The actors involved in risk and emergency management have the capability to share, access,
produce and gather information in a network-centric way instead of hierarchically. Of
course, this information should be valid, complete, accurate and up to date.
Cognitive The actors involved in risk and emergency management have developed an awareness and
shared understanding about what’s going on, what can be done and what should be done.
Physical The actors involved in risk and emergency management work together to influence the
physical domain such as the area that is or can be flooded to reduce both the damage and
the number of victims.
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operational picture, for example, can be regarded as information. The cognitive
domain is located in the mind and involves, amongst other things, situational
awareness that can be constructed from the information in the information systems
but can also result from other information e.g. resulting from face-to-face contact or
telephone contact. Moreover, existing cognitions or elements in the cognitive
domain shape observations and the interpretation of information. Previous
experiences, feelings, intuitions and values can greatly influence the perception of
information (see, for example, Te Velde et al. 2002). In this respect, wisdom, referred
to as the capacity to make value judgements based on knowledge (Walter 2005), can
be regarded as a factor which influences situational awareness
These different domains are highly connected (Von Lubitz et al. 2008a). Improved
information sharing through networks, for example, should result in a common
operational picture and subsequently in shared understanding in the cognitive
domain and into synchronised actions in the physical domain, which should result in
better collaboration and subsequently in better decisions and the reduction of disaster
impact, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The Added Value of Geotechnology in NCREM
Within previous evaluations of the use of information in risk and emergency
management, it was mentioned that crucial information was either not available or
not shared (ACIR 2005; National Research Council 2007). Geotechnology can
contribute to the organisation of the information domain through its tools for
Fig. 1 The relationship between the information, cognitive and physical domains Source: Brooijmans
(2008)
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gathering, processing, sharing and presenting information (MacFarlane 2005). This
can be regarded as a prerequisite for creating situational awareness, synchronising
actions and, finally, limiting disaster impact effectively. First of all, geotechnology
can support the collection and subsequent integration of relevant spatial data, such as
population or topographic data, which can be brought together in comprehensive
databases. Subsequently, these data can be used for further analytical operations like
the selection of areas higher than one metre above sea level or the calculation of the
number of people living in a specific area. Through these static operations, a
descriptive model of an area can be developed, which can result in an initial
operational picture of the area or the event (see, for example, Köhler and Wächter
2006; MacFarlane 2005; Van de Ven et al. 2008; Zerger 2002). Furthermore,
modelling functions can be included within geo-tools which can be used for scenario
development, e.g. to explore flood patterns resulting from breaches of dikes in
different locations. These tools are especially useful when the risk, e.g. the particular
location of a dike breach, is not fully known. Assessment tools can be used to
identify the consequences of flooding in the light of different objectives, e.g. damage
reduction or the reduction of casualties, to explore different alternatives. In addition,
geotechnology can support the visualisation of information through maps, charts,
graphs, tables, animations or 3D graphics and such images can support actors
involved in risk and emergency management (MacFarlane 2005). Moreover,
geotechnology can contribute to the exchange of geographical information through
which collaboration can be supported as discussed previously. Spatial information
infrastructures (SIIs), also referred to as geo-data infrastructures (GDIs) or spatial
data infrastructures (SDIs), can be regarded as the central concept for creating
interoperable systems and enabling the exchange of geographical data and
information. This exchange requires technical standards such as ISO standards,
access networks such as the internet, policies such as those on conditions for data
sharing and guidelines on responsibilities towards information production and
maintenance of required spatial data sets, and, last but not least, individuals who use
the spatial information, together with information suppliers and any value-adding
agents in between (Mansourian et al. 2006; Williamson and Rajabifard 2003). In this
respect, an appropriate SII that enables the exchange of information is increasingly
considered a critical aspect to support risk and emergency management activities
(Cutter 1996; Greene 2002; Grothe et al. 2008; Köhler and Wächter 2006;
Mansourian et al. 2006; Parker et al. 2007; Scholten et al. 1998).
It has been argued that major events and crises, even though they seem structured
problems in the beginning, will inevitably pass into the unstructured domain in due
course (French and Niculae 2005). This unstructured character can hamper the use of
geotechnology since, when it is unclear which problems should be tackled and
which objectives should be met, it is also hard to use geo-tools for analysis.
Nevertheless, this point was nuanced within the GDI4DM project. Even within these
chaotic circumstances, structured working processes can be recognised, such as
alerting or source and effect control (Diehl and Van der Heide 2005; Dilo and
Zlatanova 2008; Fruijtier et al. 2009; Snoeren 2006). The problems that need to be
tackled within these working processes as well as the objectives that should be met
can be well defined in advance, i.e. through contingency planning. In addition, a
considerable part of the informational requirements could be defined beforehand.
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Clearly then a chaotic, unstructured event contains both structured, semi-structured
and unstructured subproblems, which can be supported through geotechnology.
Moreover, geotechnology can stimulate communication and collaboration between
actors, which is regarded as crucial under chaotic circumstances (French and Niculae
2005). Comparable arguments can be made in the context of risk management. Even
though a planning problem, e.g. on the desired land use in the future, can be
unstructured, the risk management problem within the planning process can be
structured or semi-structured. Moreover, the information derived from the geo-tools
can be used in discussions, e.g. as idea or argument to structure problems and
objectives (Shulock 1999; Weiss 1991).
Towards an Architecture for Geo-enabled NCREM
The principles for NCREM have only been made operational through a system for
supporting emergency management. Nevertheless, the experiences with these
emergency management systems are also relevant for risk management as discussed
in the concluding section. Even though massive investments have been made in the
development of geo-tools and SIIs, the special needs of emergency management
have rarely been addressed (National Research Council 2007). To meet the
requirements for network-centric risk management and emergency response, new
geographical systems and especially architectures have had to be developed. One
major challenge associated with the architecture for a geo-enabled network-centric
software solution lays in the connection of all the people, organisations, services and
networks through which existing and in situ data were made available and easily
accessible when needed. A mobile first responder in a crisis situation, for example,
has to be able to get up-to-date geoinformation from the disaster management
service. Nevertheless, during a disaster, a constant availability and capacity of the
network cannot be guaranteed, especially not for field workers. Therefore, peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks were used to connect the actors in the field with each other and
with the actors in the coordination centres.
While quite common in military command and control systems, the P2P
technology is still insufficiently explored in civil applications and especially in
emergency response situations (Bortenschlager et al. 2007). A P2P network differs
from a more traditional client-server architecture in which a relatively low number of
servers provide information to different clients or applications. Strictly speaking, a
P2P network does not make a distinction between ‘clients’ and ‘servers’, but consists
of equal entities, i.e. peers or nodes, which can serve both as clients and servers to
other nodes. These nodes can be linked with each other via ad hoc connections and
allow for sharing of a large number of data, including real-time data. The P2P
technology enables systems to be functional when a constant network connectivity
with a server could not be guaranteed, since a P2P network allows the exchange of
information via other nodes available, either through a wireless local area network
(WLAN) or mobile network or using ad hoc P2P networks (Bortenschlager et al.
2007) (Fig. 2).
Within Eagle, the client-server approach and the P2P technology were integrated
into one system architecture as shown in Fig. 3. This architecture consist of four
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major elements: 1) A P2P environment where the information is exchanged between
the involved organisations and people using a P2P network. 2) the centralised server
environment making the information available to non-P2P clients. Several
organisations work with certain client software which do not support OGC
Fig. 2 A client-server (left) versus peer-to-peer network (right)
Fig. 3 The Eagle system architecture
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standards, like Microsoft Sharepoint, or require support for specific interfaces like
the ESRI processing services. Therefore, besides the OGC compliant services, other
service interfaces had to be implemented. The P2P connectors connect the P2P
environment with the server environment (in both directions) and is used to feed data
from the external services into the P2P network. 3) ETL (Extract-Transform-Load):
extracts information from the external web services, transforms this into the data
model used by Eagle and loads the transformed information into one or more
databases and/or distributes the information on the P2P network. 4) External
services, which were data repositories of various organisations which could possess
valuable geoinformation such as citizen and building registers, meteorological and
statistical data. information. The organisations and institutions maintaining these
data repositories were supposed to provide 24-7 access to their servers and
applications. The Netherlands, for example, has identified approximately 30 of such
data sets and the responsible organisations will be obliged to provide OGC services
for access. The generated information is retrieved from the P2P network and stored
in databases (Dilo and Zlatanova 2008). Of course, calling the services directly has
the main advantage of providing the most recent information. However, if these
services are not available or overloaded, the information that was retrieved
previously by another P2P client can be used instead. Consequently, data can be
distributed either using the P2P network or directly from the system itself.
With respect to the information that should be exchanged through the networks,
the definition of well-defined standardised services for discovery and exchange of
geo-information is required. Geoinformation services refer to the processing of geo-
data which result in processed information, e.g. the potential water depth at a
particular point or the fastest route from A to B (Annoni et al. 2005; Drummond and
French 2008; Scholten et al. 2008). These services can be acquired from a great
variety of available user-specific systems and can be presented in different
applications, to meet specific user requirements and user interfaces and to enable
the implementation of services from one application into another.
Such services are closely related to the development of SIIs. Initiatives for SIIs are in
progress at many levels all over the world, e.g. INSPIRE in Europe (www.ec-gis.org/
inspire). These have to be further enriched to be able to serve the emergency sector.
Large international projects, e.g. ORCHESTRA (www.eu-orchestra.org), OASIS
(www.oasis-fp6.org) and WIN (ww.win-eu.org) have been reporting results of their
research in this area. Proposals for standards and services developed within these
projects are in process of discussion within the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC,
www.opengeospatial.org). However, all these services designed for client-server
architecture can be made available within the P2P network. Selecting the relevant data
and services required extensive investigations of user requirements and formal
specifications of the emergency response processes and the data created and required
within each sub-process of emergency response (Dilo and Zlatanova 2008; Snoeren
2006). For that reason, a two step approach was applied: (i) the design of a conceptual
model of emergency management processes and data requirements, using Unified
Modelling Language (UML), and (ii) deriving a data model.
On the visualisation and communication level, special attention was given to the
creation and exchange of the common operational picture. Traditionally, this
common operational picture was presented and exchanged through static situation
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reports, which were spread in a hierarchical way. These reports have been very
useful to inform actors involved in emergency response about the actual situation.
Nevertheless, three main drawbacks with respect to these traditional situation
reports, were recognised (Van de Ven et al. 2008). First, it took time for situation
reports to arrive at other teams, especially at teams at the higher level. Second,
situation reports provided a static view of the dynamic situation. Consequently they
were often out-dated. Third, not everybody who needed the information had access
to the information. In addition to these drawbacks, it should be mentioned that
situation reports often consisted of pages of text, which required time for reading.
As a way to deal with these drawbacks, two alternative interfaces were used
together: SitPlot and SitText. SitPlot (Fig. 4) is a geographic interface based on
ESRI’s ArcGIS that allows its users to view, analyse and generate geographical
information that is needed for decision making, such as information on current or
potential water depth at a specific location. Figure 4 represents a screenshot of the
SitPlot application at the beginning of an emergency exercise. It presents the area in
which one of the emergency response exercises took place. On the left-hand side,
different data layers, including reference and thematic data, can be selected such as
topographic maps or maps with information about the population in the area. On the
right-hand side, information about the incident can be added such as the location of
the incident or the location of emergency services. The shared picture as presented in
SitPlot results from the inputs from the different sections within the regional
operational team (see also “Experiences from the Eagle One Exercise”) and is
available on every pc on which Sitplot is installed and activated. Consequently,
people who need access to the situation reports can have access to these reports.
Moreover, the report can be accessed quickly after they are disseminated. Users can
add maps to SitPlot, e.g. maps which represent the location of an incident or the
accessibility of an area, and these maps then become available as separate map layer
in SitPlot. Plotters in the information-section take care of the integration of the added
Fig. 4 SitPlot
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maps. In addition, they can carry out analytical operations within SitPlot in order to
meet specific information requirements of various sections of the regional
operational team during the exercise, such as an analysis of the number of people
that will be affected by a toxic cloud. Consequently, the situation reports are no
longer static, but dynamic. In addition, new possibilities for visualisation and
communication of situation reports are added, since SitPlot also allows analytical
operations.
SitText (Fig. 5) is a collective workspace used for storing and exchanging texts. It
allows its users to send and receive short text messages. SitText consisted of
different tabs for different groups of users such as the fire department of the police
department. Figure 5 represents an example of SitText, which represents the
situational report during one of the exercises. It contains information about various
aspects of the emergency such as the weather conditions i.e. temperature 20°, wind,
Northeast 5; the nature of the incident, i.e. a train accident; the nature and direction
of the released hazardous materials; the possibilities for emergency response i.e.
some roads are blocked; the number of people affected together with an indication of
the seriousness of their injuries and the actions undertaken i.e. emergency services
have entered the train, the water board is warned. On the left-hand side, it is
indicated which users are online. On the top, the different tabs can be selected.
Through SitPlot and SitText, a more dynamic view of the actual situation could be
given, which could be exchanged with the actors involved in emergency
management in a fast and efficient way.
Fig. 5 SitText
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Experiences from the Eagle One Exercise
In the Netherlands, most emergency incidents of a minor nature are responded to at
the local level by the emergency services including the fire brigade, paramedic teams
and the police department. When there is a need for a structured coordination, a
coordination team of representatives of the emergency services is formed at the site
of an incident. When the magnitude of the emergency increases, other parties at
other administrative levels can become involved and a regional coordination team is
formed. This coordination team is often situated in the regional emergency
operations centre of the safety region remote from the incident and consists of
representatives of the emergency services and the municipality. The mayor of the
municipality in which the incident is taking place has the administrative lead within
the regional coordination team. The nature of a disaster may require the need for the
involvement of additional, specialised organisations such as the water board in case
of a flooding. When the potential magnitude of an incident leads to a serious threat
to a large section of the community in the incident vicinity, to the environment, or to
anticipated severe damage to property, emergency officers at provincial or national
level are involved (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2003; Scholtens 2008).
The Eagle One exercise focussed on the regional level and took place in the
Safety region Gelderland Midden, in the Gelderland province, located in the east of
the Netherlands (Fig. 6). The central objective of Eagle One was to test and evaluate the
use of information and geotechnology through testing the Eagle applicationsystem.
Fig. 6 Safety region Gelderland Midden
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Eagle was applied in the regional operational team of the regional coordination centre.
The regional emergency operations centre consists of a policy team, mainly focussed on
decision making, and an operational team, which advises the policy team and executes
the strategies developed by the team. The regional operational team communicates with
both the policy team and with the actors in the field on the site of the incident. The
regional operational team itself consists of eight sections: Informationmanagement; Fire
department; Police department; Paramedics; Logistics; Municipality; Information
services; and Third parties, consisting of organisations with specific expertise such as
the water board during a flood or electricity companies during a power breakdown. The
focus of the exercise was on the regional operational team. Proposed actions in the
regional operational team were not executed and practiced in the field.
During the exercise, every section of the regional operational team was observed
and particular attention was paid to the information domain in general and the
communication process and the use of information and information systems in
particular. The exercise was also evaluated in a plenary session with the participants.
In addition, participants in the exercise were asked to fill in an online questionnaire.
Within this questionnaire a distinction was made between users that used only
SitPlot, referred to as SitPlot respondents and users that used both SitPlot and
SitText, referred to as SitPlot and SitText respondents (Table 2). The observations
and evaluations have resulted in two evaluation reports on network-centric sharing
of information, the use of information and the Eagle application during Eagle One
(Brooijmans 2008; Van de Ven 2008), one technical evaluation of the Eagle
application (Geodan 2008) and one evaluation of the emergency management in
general during Eagle One (Van Capelleveen 2008) resulting in an overall evaluation
of the use of geo-information and Geo-ICT in the Eagle One exercise (Riedijk et al.
2008). In this section, only the main findings are summarised according to network-
centric domain.
Information Domain
Through the information systems, the different units of the regional operational team
were connected and were able to share information directly. Even though decision
Table 2 Respondents to the questionnaires
Organisation SitPlot SitText+SitPlot Total
Respondents Respondents
Fire brigade 7 8 15
Police 2 3 5
Paramedics 1 2 3
Municipality 1 2 3
Other 3 1 4
Unknown 2 4 6
Total 16 20 36
Source: Brooijmans (2008).
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making still took place in a hierarchical way, the information could be shared more
easily. In contrast with the established practices within the regional operational team,
in which information was shared hierarchically from top to bottom or from bottom to
top, information from one actor was now shared with other actors immediately.
Moreover, more sources of information were available, since the regional actors
were also connected to national and local geographical databases. In addition to
having access to the information and the common operational picture that was
derived from the information, participants could also contribute to the common
picture from their own perspective.
Through this way of organising information, the required information was mainly
available in the information system as was also illustrated by the response to
questions related to the information domain. For example, more than 50% of the
SitPlot respondents stated that all information needed was present in SitPlot and 83%
stated that this information supported their tasks. Nevertheless, some redundant
information was also available in the system, since 64% agreed that some data layers
would never be used. There was some variation in the assessment of accuracy of the
data in the SitPlot system, however, with 21% agreeing that there was too much
detail, 43% desired more detail. In addition, specific attention should be given to the
accuracy of data, since 46% of the SitPlot respondents found errors in the data
compared with 14% who did not and 40% who did not know or gave a neutral
answer. In addition, data should be more up-to-date as was agreed by 54% of the
SitPlot respondents although 23% disagreed. Related to this, only 36% of these
respondents regarded the information in the system as valid and reliable compared
with 14% who did not.
Cognitive Domain
It can be concluded that the Eagle system contributed to both a common operational
picture and a shared operational awareness. This was best observed during the
multidisciplinary meetings. Little time was spent on explaining the situation, but the
actors immediately started to plan actions. In addition, the responses to the
questionnaires suggested that also the actors themselves perceived an increased
situational awareness. Almost three quarters of the SitPlot and SitText respondents
(72%) argued that other sections of the regional operational team had the same
operational picture and 94% argued that actors in the same section had the same
operational picture. Almost 90% of the SitPlot respondents argued that they had a
better overview of what happened because information was shared through maps.
Moreover, 86% of the SitText and SitPlot respondents agreed that they had a better
operational picture through SitPlot and SitText.
The available information helped greatly to shape the situational awareness of
the participants. Even though this contributed to a shared situational awareness,
it also caused some problems during the exercise, especially when information
was taken for granted. For example, participants focused on vulnerable people
from nursing and elderly homes that were available in the database, while
neglecting other groups of vulnerable people. Therefore a critical attitude
towards the information available and presented in the information system is
required.
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Physical Domain
In the end, improved information and communication should result in a shared
situational awareness and to improved collaboration resulting in the reduction of the
impact of an incident. It was difficult, however, to judge if the organisation of
information and the geotechnology system being tested actually resulted in better
actions and effects. The setup of the training did not allow for making a distinction
between different but parallel groups through which results of the exercise with the
information system could have been compared with groups who worked in a
traditional way without the system. Undertaking the exercise with a network-centric
approach and the information system was a general objective and, therefore, groups
were not excluded from using the system. Nevertheless, results on the collaboration
and shared situational awareness already indicated that the information contributed
to a reduction of potential effects of an incident through improving the
communication, information and, related to that, the situational awareness. In
addition, the questionnaire results suggested that the system had contributed
positively to decision making in general, since over 70% of the SitPlot and the
SitPlot and SitText respondents agreed that the information system improved the
quality of their work in general.
Discussion
Conceptualising risk and emergency management as a point of departure for
developing information systems may look simple and straightforward in theory.
However, it turned out to be difficult to do this in practice. Ideas on what risk
management and emergency response is about or how it should be carried out are
often implicit and hard to make explicit. It turned out to be useful to switch from
particular conceptions derived from project meetings with developers and users
within the project to a more general conception in the literature to develop an
interpreting framework through which risk and emergency management as a process
could be conceptualised. This way of developing an interpretative framework was
referred to as abduction. The conceptualisation of risk and emergency management
as network-centric operations turned out to be useful to understand risk and
emergency management practices and to develop points of departure for the
development of an information infrastructure through which geoinformation and
geotechnology could be organised. The network-centric concept was useful as an
overall concept to structure existing ideas on collaboration, shared situational
awareness, information sharing, geotechnology and SIIs. Nevertheless, little was
added to existing ideas on risk and emergency management or geotechnology
and SII development. Its contribution to geotechnologies, for example, seemed
limited, especially with respect to existing ideas on networks and services as
developed in the field of SIIs (see, for example, Mansourian et al. 2006). Of
course, the network-centric concept was useful in practice to convince the actors
involved in emergency response of the need of information sharing and
interoperability and consequently to create a shared situational awareness on how
geoinformation and geotechnology should be organised. In the end, however, we
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believe that the added value of the network-centric approach goes beyond its value
for marketing or structuring ideas.
A critical innovative aspect of the network-centric approach is its philosophy on
information sharing. Whereas information was initially shared in an hierarchical
way, the implementation of the network-centric approach resulted in a network-
centric dissemination of information through which new information on the actual
situation of actions of other actors became available immediately to actors involved
in emergency response through which actions could be adapted to both the new
situation and the actions of other actors. This network-centric way of information
sharing instead of a hierarchical way also triggered technological innovations, such
as the implementation of a P2P network to guarantee a constant information
exchange during emergencies. In addition, network-centric risk and emergency
management can be regarded as another way of coordinating activities and of
stimulating collaboration in risk and emergency management. Actual emergency
management processes in the Netherlands are being criticised for its hierarchical top-
down command structure. These commands are regarded as ineffective ways of
coordination during emergencies (Scholtens 2008). Nevertheless, coordination is not
necessarily achieved through central commands, but can also be stimulated through
information sharing and the development of a common operational picture as
assumed in the network-centric approach, which can support self-managing ways of
collaboration as an alternative for collaboration through central commands and
control (see also Scholtens 2008).
These principles and lessons as derived from the development of Eagle and the
emergency training can also be relevant for risk management processes. Of course, it
can be argued that relevant risk information for risk management is already
becoming available and shared, e.g. through improved and increased risk assessment
or through the worldwide development of spatial data clearinghouses as a main
element of SIIs (Crompvoets et al. 2004). These existing information infrastructures,
however, do often not meet the specific requirements needed for emergency response
such as network stability or the speed of information availability and exchange
(National Research Council 2007). Therefore, the organisation and development of
geotechnology and geoinformation for risk management should also be considered
in the light of the requirements for emergency management so that the information
and networks can also be used during an emergency. Moreover, principles of a
network-centric dissemination of information in risk management should be
considered. In risk management practices, it is not uncommon that information is
distributed hierarchically. Changes in the nature and amount of hazardous materials
at a particular installation, for example, are often distributed hierarchically, e.g. from
the plant operator to a National Health and Safety Executive, who should forward
this information to a local planning department (Basta et al. 2007). Even though risk
management practices are less time-critical, a network-centric organisation of
information dissemination and information systems can still contribute to a more
realistic picture of the safety risks of a particular area and consequently to an
improved situational awareness which can result in improved collaboration and
coordination and subsequently to more effective risk management. Outdated
information, for example, can result into inappropriate safety distances or
contingency plans.
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As mentioned earlier, the starting point of an abductive approach should be in the
particular, situation specific phenomena and not in the existing and often general
theories. Therefore, prudence for using the NCREM concept is called for, since a
conceptualisation of risk and emergency management practices as network centric
processes does not guarantee that information is spread in a network centric way. A
critical approach towards actual, situation specific processes is therefore required. In
this light, NCREM is more a target than an accurate description of risk and
emergency practices. In addition, abduction does not result in general, but in context
specific theories. Even though we regard the NCREM concept as valuable in
general, it may need to be adapted to specific circumstances, for example when an
immediate netcentric distribution of information conflicts with requirements on
accuracy and validity. In such cases, a mixture between hierarchical and network
centric ways of information dissemination can be considered. For example,
information can be send to an information manager first, who validates the
information and then sends the information to the actors involved.
Moreover, the interpretative framework should be tested in practice. Within this
case study, for example, a SII based on NCREM principles was developed and
tested. Even though the first results are promising, further evaluation of such systems
is required. First of all, the investigation of information requirements needs to be
refined. The case study showed that some information was redundant. Following an
abductive approach, findings in practice can be combined with literature and
findings from other practices to reduce redundancy and to increase the completeness
of information. Second, the actual effects of having a common operational picture on
the actions that are taken in the physical domain should be explored further. Within
the Eagle One case, it was difficult to judge if the organisation of information
resulted in better actions and effects. Therefore, trainings with parallel groups with
and without the information system are desirable to study the effects of the
information system on actions and the potential bottlenecks and mechanisms
between information and action.
Moreover, more attention for the implementation of an information system that
can support NCREM is required. Even though network-centric warfare has been
highly technology driven (Von Lubitz et al. 2008a), we believe that the added value
of the network-centric approach for the organisation of geotechnology in risk and
emergency response lies in the network-centric organisation of information
dissemination, which subsequently requires technology such as the development of
services and networks. An exclusive focus on technology is therefore undesirable,
since it can derive attention away from crucial organisational aspects. For example,
people should be willing to share information in a network-centric way.
In addition, it can be argued that, according to network-centric emergency
response principles, people with a better information position should be able to take
better decisions. The central command can still give orders to lower level units about
the objectives that should be achieved but these operational units do have the
freedom to decide on how these objectives should be achieved as is worked out in
the Netherlands defence doctrine (Ministry of Defence 2005). As stated by Von
Lubitz et al. (2008a: 576), “the net effect of network-centricity is much greater
operational and tactical freedom for the individual units that support the most
effective execution of ‘commander’s intent’ as well as operational coordination of all
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activities within the entire spectrum of the assigned missions”. Clearly then, the
elaboration of network-centric risk and emergency management is about both the
organisation of information and about the organisation of risk and emergency
management itself. Consequently, the development of geotechnology for risk and
emergency management is not only about the information system or technology
itself, but also about the way risks or emergencies can or should be addressed and
dealt with, which requires a conception of risk and emergency management
activities.
Conclusions
Risk and emergency management activities have been portrayed as network-centric
operations in which collaboration and information exchange are required. Based on
this conceptualisation of risk and emergency management practices, it has been
argued that information should no longer be shared in a hierarchical way.
Information should be shared and available at all levels at the same moment
through information networks. The development and implementation of a spatial
information infrastructure is desirable to organise geographical information for
emergency management and to facilitate information sharing and integration during
emergency preparation and response. Organising geographic information and
geotechnology in a network-centric way can lead to improved information;
improved communication; better situational awareness; better and faster decision
making and more effective risk management and emergency response.
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